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Abstract
In quantum physics the term ‘contextual’ can be used in more than one way. One
usage, here called ‘Bell contextual’ since the idea goes back to Bell, is that if A, B
and C are three quantum observables, with A compatible (i.e., commuting) with B
and also with C, whereas B and C are incompatible, a measurement of A might yield
a different result (indicating that quantum mechanics is contextual) depending upon
whether A is measured along with B (the {A,B} context) or with C (the {A,C}
context). An analysis of what projective quantum measurements measure shows that
quantum theory is Bell noncontextual: the outcome of a particular A measurement
when A is measured along with B would have been exactly the same if A had, instead,
been measured along with C.
A different definition, here called ‘globally (non)contextual’ refers to whether or not
there is (’noncontextual’) or is not (’contextual’) a single joint probability distribution
that simultaneously assigns probabilities in a consistent manner to the outcomes of
measurements of a certain collection of observables, not all of which are compatible.
A simple example shows that such a joint probability distribution can exist even in a
situation where the measurement probabilities cannot refer to properties of a quantum
system, and hence lack physical significance, even though mathematically well-defined.
It is noted that the quantum sample space, a projective decomposition of the identity,
required for interpreting measurements of incompatible properties in different runs of
an experiment using different types of apparatus has a tensor product structure, a fact
sometimes overlooked.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Bell Contextual 3
∗Electronic address: rgrif@cmu.edu
1
3 Quantum Measurements 4
4 Quantum Mechanics is Bell Noncontextual 6
5 An Alternative Definition of ‘Contextual’ 8
5 (a) Global Contextuality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5 (b)An Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5 (c) Probabilities of Measurements? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6 Summary and Conclusion 11
1 Introduction
The terms ‘context’ and ‘contextual’ are used with a variety of different meanings. In
this article they refer to the concepts as they appear in quantum physics, in particular
quantum foundations; there is no attempt to relate them to usages which occur in other fields,
such as psychology. Unfortunately, even in the restricted domain of quantum foundations
one finds more than one usage and, what is equally unfortunate, carelessness on the part
of some authors whose definitions are not clearly stated, and sometimes hard to extract
from the context (to use a different sense of that word) in which their discussions appear.
All of which adds to the general confusion which has given quantum foundations a bad
reputation among physicists working in other disciplines. In this paper two quite distinct
usages of ‘(non)contextual’ will be discussed. One is due to Bell, and appears in older work
on quantum foundations; for this I will use the term ‘Bell (non)contextual’. It is discussed
in Secs. 2 to 4. The other is frequently found in more recent work and for it I use the term
‘global (non)contextual’. A precise definition, motivated by work of Abramsky et al. [1], is
presented in Sec. 5. There are undoubtedly other definitions to be found in the literature,
but in the present work I limit myself to these two.
As the title suggests, my aim is to relate ‘(non)contextual’ to the topic of quantum mea-
surements. Here there is enormous confusion, as exemplified by the well-known measurement
problem. Alas, ‘measurement’ is another term often used in quantum foundations without a
clear meaning, so of necessity any discussion of how it relates to contextuality must be based
on some understanding of, if not solution to, the measurement problem. In fact there are (at
least) two measurement problems. The first, widely discussed, problem is how to think about
the macroscopic outcome of a measurement, traditionally referred to as a pointer position,
since unitary time evolution often results in a quantum superposition (Schro¨dinger cat) of
possible measurement outcomes. The second, less discussed but equally important, is how
to infer from the macroscopic outcome the earlier microscopic property that the apparatus
was designed to measure. Both problems are discussed in Sec. 3. The second is the one most
intimately connected to notions of quantum contextuality.
The approach employed in the remainder of this paper is, without apology, based upon
the consistent histories (CH), or decoherent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics.
It is, so far as I know, the only interpretation presently available which can provide a complete
solution to both measurement problems. There is no room in a short article to reproduce its
essential features; the reader will find an accessible overview in [2], and a helpful introduction
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to the way it deals with the aforementioned measurement problem(s) in [3–5]. The conclusion
in Sec. 4 is that quantum theory is Bell noncontextual, in agreement with earlier work in [6]
and in Sec. V E of [5]. The notion of ‘global contextuality’ (my terminology) motivated
by [1] is discussed in Sec. 5. There is an overall summary in Sec. 6.
2 Bell Contextual
So far as I know, the term ‘contextual’ as used in quantum foundations goes back to
an early paper by Bell [7].1 It is not altogether easy to follow Bell’s presentation, but I
believe the general idea is the following; see, e.g., the discussion in Sec. VII of [9]. Let
A, B, and C be three quantum observables—for present purposes an ’observable’ is any
Hermitian operator on a (finite-dimensional) Hilbert space—and assume that A commutes
with B and with C, but B does not commute with C. Hence according to a principle of
standard (textbook) quantum mechanics, it is possible to measure A along with B, or A
along with C, but one cannot measure all three, A, B, and C at the same time, i.e, in a
single experimental run. Bell noted that for this reason a measurement of A along with B
requires a different apparatus than a measurement of A along with C, and, with good reason,
asked the question: would the value obtained for A be the same when measured with B as
when measured with C? If the answer is ‘Yes’ then quantum mechanics (or whatever theory
one is using to analyze this situation) is noncontextual, whereas if the answer is ‘No’, or at
least ‘No’ in certain cases, quantum mechanics (or the theory in question) is contextual in
the sense that the measurement outcome for A depends upon whether it is measured along
with B, the {A,B} context or together with C, the {A,C} context.
This distinction seems clear enough until one gives it careful thought and finds that there
are conceptual traps hidden inside what looks at the outset like a straightforward definition.
One of these is found in the term ‘measured’: what is a quantum measurement? Does one
mean a macroscopic measurement outcome, a pointer position if we use the picturesque,
albeit archaic, terminology of quantum foundations? Or is it the prior microscopic property
inferred from the pointer position? Let us assume the latter: the apparatus pointer indicates
that observable A had the value A = a1 in a particular run of the experiment, one in which
B was measured at the same time as A using what we might call the AB apparatus. If,
instead, in this particular run, A had been measured along with C using the (necessarily
different) AC apparatus, would the A pointer have ended up once again indicating A = a1?
Note that this is not at all the same question as asking whether the probability distribution
for A outcomes during a set of repeated AB measurements, all starting with the same initial
state for the particle, would be the same as that of the A outcomes during a similar set
of AC measurements. Standard textbook quantum mechanics tells us that if we start with
a particular initial state the marginal distribution of A outcomes computed from the joint
distribution of two commuting observables A and B will be the same as that computed
from the joint distribution of A and C. The question raised by Bell was not the identity of
distributions, but the identity of outcomes in the same run. Since A, B, and C cannot be
measured simultaneously, this is a counterfactual question: A was measured with B; what
1Bell did not use the term “contextual,” which was only later introduced to represent his idea; see
Shimony’s discussion in [8], and in particular the remarks included in reference 8 in the bibliography of [8].
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would have been the A outcome had it (contrary to fact) been measured along with C?
Thus the question of whether quantum mechanics is or is not Bell contextual has embed-
ded in it some issues in quantum foundations concerning which it is safe to say there is no
general agreement. My position regarding them will emerge in the next section; all I can ask
of the sceptical reader is to pay attention to the arguments and try and assess their validity
with an open mind.
3 Quantum Measurements
Consider a projective measurement on a system, hereafter thought of as a particle, of an
observable A = A† with spectral representation
A =
∑
j
ajPj,
∑
j
Pj = Ip (3.1)
where the aj are the distinct eigenvalues of A, thus aj 6= ak if j 6= k, and the Pj are
projectors, Pj = P
†
j = P
2
j , which are mutually orthogonal: for j 6= k, PjPk = 0. The
collection {Pj} of orthogonal projectors which sum to the identity Ip on the Hilbert space
Hp of the particle is a projective decomposition of the identity or PDI. The measuring process
is assumed to be such that if the particle is initially in some state |ψ〉 with the (microscopic)
property Pj, i.e., Pj|ψ〉 = |ψ〉, then its interaction with the measurement apparatus will,
by unitary time evolution, lead to a state |Ψ〉 which lies in a subspace, with projector Mj ,
of the apparatus Hilbert space Hm, i.e., Mj |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉. The subspace Mj corresponds to
the (macroscopic) apparatus pointer being in the position j. Since the different pointer
positions are macroscopically distinct, we can safely assume that MjMk = 0 for j 6= k, and
by adding an additional projector M0 to cover all other possibilities (e.g., the apparatus has
broken down), we can assume that {Mj} is a projective decomposition of the identity Im of
the apparatus Hilbert space. Note that we are thinking of the {Mj} as referring to a later
time when the measurement is over and the particle has disappeared, or else has become a
very small part of what we call the apparatus—this gets around any need to ‘collapse’ the
particle wavefunction at the end of the measurement. However, if one adopts von Neumann’s
measurement model in which the particle continues to exist as a separate entity when the
measurement is over, so one is dealing with a Hilbert space Hp⊗Hm, one need only replace
Mj in the preceding discussion with Ip ⊗Mj , a projector which signifies that the apparatus
pointer is in position j, and provides no information about the state of the particle. (The
idea that a measurement should “collapse” the particle wavefunction is only relevant if one
is considering the subsequent history of the particle after the measurement is over. See the
discussion in Sec. IV C of [5].)
Next we need to dispose of the two measurement problems. The first arises when the
initial particle state is some superposition of states corresponding to different eigenvalues of
A, say
|ψ〉 =
∑
j
rj|φj〉, Pk|ψj〉 = δjk|φj〉, (3.2)
with at least two of the rj unequal to zero. Then unitary time evolution will, as is well-
known, lead to a later apparatus state |Ψ〉 which no longer falls in just one of the pointer
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subspaces {Mj}, so it is a macroscopic quantum superposition, or in popular terminology a
Schro¨dinger cat. What shall we do with it? Let us follow the advice of Born and use the
Schro¨dinger wave |Ψ〉 to assign a probability
pj = 〈Ψ|Mj |Ψ〉 (3.3)
to each measurement outcome. When used in this manner I refer to |Ψ〉 as a pre-probability,
i.e., something used to generate a probability distribution, as in (3.3), to be carefully dis-
tinguished from the projector [Ψ] = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| that represents a hard-to-interpret quantum
property, the weird ‘cat state’.
The CH interpretation treats quantum mechanics, following Born, as a stochastic theory
in which time development must be understood using probabilities. But as in classical
physics, probabilities require a sample space of mutually exclusive possibilities, one and only
one of which is thought to take place in a particular run of the experiment. In quantum
theory a sample space is always a PDI. The orthogonality of the projectors ensures that only
one, and the fact that they sum to the identity means at least one, of these possibilities will
occur in any particular situation. In classical physics the choice of a sample space is usually
quite straightforward, and if two or more spaces are of interest in some situation it causes no
difficulty, as one can always combine them. But in quantum mechanics one needs to make
different choices depending on what aspect of a situation one is interested in. Thus let {Pj}
and {Qk} be two PDIs for the same system. If and only if they are compatible,
PjQk = QkPj for all j and k (3.4)
can there be a common refinement, a PDI consisting of all the nonzero PjQk; otherwise they
are incompatible and cannot be combined. The CH approach resolves (or evades or tames)
the standard quantum paradoxes by means of the single framework rule, which prohibits as
meaningless those arguments which reach some conclusion by (often implicitly) combining
properties belonging to incompatible PDIs or frameworks ; the latter term can include PDIs
involving events at different times.
An immediate application to the present discussion arises from the fact that the {Mj},
the possible measurement outcomes, form a PDI. But there is another PDI with just two
projectors, [Ψ] and Im−[Ψ], with [Ψ] = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| the weird ‘cat’ property introduced above, and
Im the identity on the apparatus Hilbert spaceHm. This PDI, {[Ψ], Im−[Ψ]}, is incompatible,
with the {Mj} PDI when, as we are assuming, two or more of the rj are nonzero. Both PDIs
are valid quantum descriptions, but they cannot be combined. One cannot say, at least while
being careful in the use of language, that [Ψ] corresponds to the pointer being simultaneously
in several locations, since talk of [Ψ] renders talk of pointer positions represented by the Mj
meaningless.2 In summary, the CH approach resolves the first measurement problem, a
Schro¨dinger cat state |Ψ〉 of the output, by employing a framework or PDI {Mk} as the
sample space to which |Ψ〉 assigns probabilities according to the Born rule, rather than
using the PDI {[Ψ], Im− [Ψ]}, in which talk of the pointer having a position is meaningless.
To justify the belief of the experimental physicist that the apparatus he has carefully
constructed to carry out some sort of measurement of a microscopic property does what it
2In the quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann [10], the combination of [Ψ] and some Mj is mean-
ingful, but false. This, alas, is not very helpful; see the discussion in Sec. 4.6 of [11].
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was designed to do, we need to solve the second quantum measurement problem. In the
case of the projective measurement of A, this means being able to infer from the outcome,
the pointer position Mj , in a particular run of the experiment, that in this run the particle
actually had the property Pj, corresponding to the eigenvalue aj of A, immediately before
the measurement took place. The theoretical analysis that justifies this requires the use of
quantum histories, and in the interests of brevity we refer the reader to other work [3–5] for
details. Experimenters will generally want to calibrate a piece of apparatus to check that it
is working properly before using it to gather data. The simplest sort of calibration is to send
into the apparatus, on several successive runs, particles which are known to have a specific
property Pj , and checking that the pointer always ends up in the corresponding positionMj .
After doing this for all the different j values, the experimenter will feel justified in assuming
that when a particle in an unknown state arrives that causes the pointer to end up at Mj ,
this particle just before the measurement had the property Pj.
This sounds sensible, but what if the particle was initially prepared not in an eigenstate
of A, but instead in some superposition, as in (3.2), with several nonzero rj? Granted, there
is no reason, if we employ the framework {Mj} for analyzing the macroscopic outcome, to
suppose the pointer will end up in a weird superposition; instead it will arrive at a specific
position, which will vary from run to run. But before the measurement took place, did
not the particle have the property [ψ]? That assumes a PDI {[ψ], Ip − [ψ]}, but there is
an alternative, namely the PDI {Pj}. These two PDIs are incompatible and cannot be
combined, and it is the PDI {Pj} which is useful in answering the question as to whether a
given measurement outcome Mj revealed the prior property Pj. The CH analysis justifies
treating |ψ〉 in this situation as a pre-probability which can be used to assign a probability
pj = 〈ψ|Pj|ψ〉 (3.5)
to the property Pj, which will later lead (with certainty) to the measurement outcome Mj .
Both (3.3) and (3.5) are marginals of the joint distribution
Pr(Pj ,Mk) = δjkpj, (3.6)
which results from a CH analysis employing histories and an extended Born rule. Combining
(3.3) and (3.6) yields the conditional probability
Pr(Pk |Mj) = δjk, (3.7)
which says that if the pointer ends up at Mj the particle earlier had the property Pj.
4 Quantum Mechanics is Bell Noncontextual
With a proper quantum-mechanical understanding of how to interpret measurements in
a way that makes sense and connects with laboratory practice, we are now in a position to
analyze the ABC situation introduced in Sec. 2. Let the spectral representations for B and
C be of the form, similar to (3.1),
B =
∑
k
bkQk, C =
∑
l
clRl, (4.1)
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using the PDIs {Qk} and {Rl}, where AB = BA means that PjQk = QkPj for all j and k,
and likewise AC = CA means that PjRl = RlPj . However, we are assuming BC 6= CB, so
for at least some k and some l it must be the case that QkRl 6= RlQk.
Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a measurement apparatus. In Fig. 1(a) the particle to
be measured enters from the left, the apparatus measures A, and the outcome is indicated
by the location of a pointer on the right, which can be in one of several possible positions:
the solid arrow represents a particular outcome and the dashed arrows are alternative pos-
sibilities. The modified apparatus in Fig. 1(b) has a handle which can be set in one of two
positions, B or C. When in the B position the apparatus will measure B at the same time
as A, with the value of B shown by a second pointer; while if the handle is in position C
it measures A together with C, and the second pointer indicates the measured value of C.
Moving the handle changes what happens inside the apparatus, and it can be set at the very
last moment, just before the particle enters on the left side.
|ψ〉
A
value
(a)
|ψ〉
B C
A
value
B OR C
(b)
1
Figure 1: (a) Apparatus to measure A for particle entering from the left, with outcome
shown by the pointer on the right, which can be in one of several possible positions. (b)
Apparatus which will measure A together with B or with C, depending on the setting of the
handle, which is shown in position B, but can be moved to the C position (dashed). The
second pointer indicates the B or the C outcome.
Needless to say, the careful experimenter will want to make separate sets of calibration
runs, one set with the handle in position B, and another set with it in position C. In the first
set the particles with eigenvalues (aj , bk) for A and B are repeatedly sent into the apparatus
to verify that the A and the B pointers arrive at the correct positions, while the second set
uses particles with eigenvalues (aj, cl).
With the calibrations completed, consider a run in which the apparatus handle is in
position B and at the end of the measurement the first pointer indicates that the particle
possessed the property P2 corresponding to the eigenvalue a2, while the second pointer
indicates that the particle also had, say, the property B = b1. Now suppose the handle had
been in position C rather than B during this run; would the A pointer nonetheless have
indicated a prior property P2 corresponding to a2? This is at least plausible, because the
handle could have been shifted, from B to C, just before the arrival of the particle, and since
the particle already had the property P2 before arriving at the apparatus, see the discussion
in Sec. 3, it is hard to see how a later shift of the handle could have altered this. It may be
worth noting that the counterfactual analysis used in the foregoing discussion is consistent
with a proposal made some years ago, [12] and Ch. 19 of [11], and which has stood the test
of time; see, for example, a discussion with Stapp concerning nonlocality in [13, 14].
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But what about retrocausal influences? Could a later change of the position of the handle
have altered an earlier property of the particle? So far as I know, there is not the slightest
experimental evidence for such retrocausal influences. Proposals for retrocausality sometimes
arise out of discussions of quantum correlations that violate Bell inequalities, along with a
desire to avoid attributing them to nonlocal influences; see, e.g., [15]. However, since such
correlations have a fairly straightforward explanation in terms of ordinary causes once one
has cleared away the fog associated with quantum measurement problems, see [3, 16], there
seems at present no reason to take such retrocausation proposals seriously.
Until someone points out a flaw in the argument given above, or in its predecessors
in [5,6], I will continue to maintain that quantum mechanics is Bell noncontextual. Authors
who claim that quantum mechanics is contextual and cite Bell’s work to support their claim
either have not understood what is at issue, or have not known how to analyze quantum
measurements in a consistent and fully quantum mechanical fashion.
5 An Alternative Definition of ‘Contextual’
5 (a) Global Contextuality
The term ‘contextual’ has been used in recent years in ways different from Bell’s proposal.
In some cases this is simply carelessness, but in others the usage is distinctly different from
Bell contextuality as exemplified in the ABC setup of Sec. 2. The following definition of global
contextuality is motivated by the careful and accessible discussion in Abramsky et al. [1],
but it undoubtedly represents at least the general idea behind the notion of ‘contextual’ as
used in much current work.
Consider a collection X of quantum observables, all defined on the same Hilbert space,
and define a context C (in [1] this is a ‘measurement context’) to be any set of compatible—
they commute with one another—observables belonging to X . For the ABC example of
Sec. 2, X is the collection {A,B,C}, while {A,B} and {A,C} are the two contexts. Next
assume there is a fixed initial quantum state ρ that assigns a probabilities to any projector
P using the Born rule:
Pr(P ) = Tr(ρP ). (5.1)
Using this formula will yield a joint probability distribution PrC for the observables that
make up a context C, using as a quantum sample space all nonzero products of projectors
from the PDIs associated with the different observables in C. For example, if A and B,
which commute with each other, have the spectral forms given in (3.1) and (4.1), their joint
probability distribution is
Pr{A.B}(aj , bk) = Tr(ρPjQk). (5.2)
The marginal distribution for B is obtained by summing out A,
PrB(bk) =
∑
j
Pr{A.B}(aj , bk) = Tr(ρQk), (5.3)
and that for A by summing out B.
This generalizes in an obvious way to any collection of commuting observables, and allows
one to define a joint probability distribution PrC for every context C associated with X . The
collection of all these probability distributions, one for each context, constitutes an empirical
model for X in the terminology of [1]. The fact that these probabilities are all generated using
the same initial state ρ means that they satisfy a compatibility condition: If two contexts C
and D overlap, both will assign exactly the same marginal distribution to the observables in
their intersection C ∩ D, which itself is a context (or possibly a single observable), even if C
and D are incompatible in the sense that not all observables in C ∪ D commute.
If all the observables in X commute with each other, X is itself a context, and the
probability distribution for any context C can be obtained as a marginal, by summing out
the observables not in C, of the the joint probability distribution PrX . However, even if
some observables do not commute with others, it might still be possible to find a joint global
distribution Prg for all the observables in X such that for each context C the corresponding
marginal of Prg, obtained by summing out the observables not in C, is identical to the PrC
obtained using the given ρ and the Born rule (5.1). If such a Prg exists—its entries must, of
course, be nonnegative and sum to 1—we say that the empirical model associated with X
is globally noncontextual, while if such a Prg cannot be constructed, the empirical model is
globally contextual.
Thus in the case of our ABC example in which B and C do not commute, there might be
a joint probability distribution Prg(aj , bk, cl) whose marginals, Prg(aj , bk) and Pr(aj , cl) from
summing out C and B, respectively, would coincide with the probabilities assigned to the
{A,B} and {A,C} contexts using a single initial state ρ. In this case the empirical model,
consisting of the two distributions Pr(aj , bk) and Pr(aj, cl), would be globally noncontextual,
whereas if there were no such Prg(aj , bk, cl), the empirical model would be globally contextual.
A simple, but nontrivial, example of such a globally noncontextual model is given in Sec. 5 (b)
below.
An example of global contextuality is provided by the well known violation of the Bell
CHSH inequality [17] for two spin-half particle a and b with combined Hilbert space H =
Ha⊗Hb. There are two noncommuting operators A (understood as A⊗ I on H) and A
′ for
particle a, and two noncommuting operators B and B′ for particle b, whereas both A and
A′ commute with both B and B′. The collection X = {A,A′, B, B′} thus gives rise to four
contexts {A,B}, {A,B′}, {A′, B} and {A′, B′}. The four probability distributions assigned
to these contexts using the Born rule for a particular initial state constitute an empirical
model. For a particular choice of operators and initial state the nonexistence of a global
joint probability distribution Prg(A,A
′, B, B′) with marginals that agree with those of the
four contexts is known as Fine’s theorem [18]; a discussion and some simple proofs will be
found in [19].
It is important to note that global (non)contextuality as defined here applies to an em-
pirical model, and not directly to quantum theory. Indeed, if not all the observables in X
commute, Prg cannot be a proper quantum probability since there is no quantum sample
space, no PDI, with which it can be associated. For this reason it seems somewhat mis-
leading to say that “quantum mechanics is globally contextual”, even though it is true that
quantum theory makes possible empirical models that are globally contextual.
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5 (b) An Example
Let us apply the above definition to the ABC case considered earlier in Sec. 2, where
{A,B} is one context and {A,C} a different context. Since A and B commute, the corre-
sponding PDIs {Pj} and {Qk}, (3.1) and (4.1) will have a common refinement whose sample
space consists of all the nonzero products PjQk = QkPj , and the empirical model assigns a
probability distribution
Pr{A,B}(aj , bk) = Tr(ρPjQk) (5.4)
to the {A,B} context; similarly one has
Pr{A,C}(aj , cl) = Tr(ρPjRl) (5.5)
for the {A,C} context. Whether this empirical model is (non)contextual depends on the
existence or nonexistence of a joint distribution Prg(aj, bk, cl) such that
Pr{A,B}(aj , bk) =
∑
l
Prg(aj, bk, cl), Pr{A,C}(aj, cl) =
∑
k
Prg(aj , bk, cl). (5.6)
Consider a specific case of three operators
A =


−1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 , B =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0

 , C =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 −1

 (5.7)
on a 3-dimensional Hilbert space, where the lower right 2 × 2 blocks of A, B, and C are,
respectively, the identity, the σx, and the σz Pauli matrices. Thus it is obvious that A
commutes with both B and C, whereas BC 6= CB. Each observable has two eigenvalues
equal to +1 and one equal to −1. If probabilities are assigned using the density operator
ρ =


p 0 0
0 r 0
0 0 r

 ; p ≥ 0, r ≥ 0; p+ 2r = 1; (5.8)
the joint probabilities of A and B, and of A and C, are those in the first two boxes in the
following table, where a, b, and c denote eigenvalues of A, B, and C.
{A,B}
b = 1 −1
a = 1 r r
= −1 p 0
{A,C}
c = 1 −1
a = 1 r r
= −1 p 0
{A,B,C}
b = c = 1 −1 b 6= c
a = 1 r − s r − s s
= −1 p 0 0
(5.9)
The values in the third box, where s can take any value between 0 and r, represent a
global probability distribution Pg chosen to produce the {A,B} and {A,C} marginals in the
first two boxes. It does not correspond to anything in the quantum Hilbert space since, for
example, it assigns to the triple a = 1, b = −1, c = −1 a probability r−s. But the projector
for b = −1 does not commute with the projector for c = −1, so there is no subspace of the
Hilbert space to which this probability can be assigned. Also notice that Prg is not unique
because the choice of s is not determined by the {A,B} and {A,C} marginals. Thus we have
a situation in which a (nonunique) global probability distribution exists, so the empirical
model consisting of the {A,B} and {A,C} distributions is globally noncontextual, even
though the global probability distribution Prg does not correspond to anything in Hilbert
space quantum physics.
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5 (c) Probabilities of Measurements?
In many papers discussing quantum contextuality, including [1], the probabilities under
discussion are not related in a direct way to microscopic quantum properties, but are instead
related to measurements in the sense of measurement outcomes (pointer positions). But if
some of the measured observables are incompatible with others, they cannot all be measured
at the same time using a single piece of apparatus. For example, in some runs the handle in
Fig. 1(b) is at B, while in others it is at the C position, even if the incoming particle always
prepared in the same initial state. Since the different runs are independent, they need not
be carried out in succession. One could just as well imagine two pieces of apparatus, the
first with the handle always at the B location, the second always at C, that simultaneously
carry out measurements on two identically-prepared particles labeled 1 and 2. This joint
measurement can be analyzed using an obvious extension of the approach in Sec. 4, and
the two pointer readings related to a PDI, a quantum sample space, representing properties
before measurement. But now the sample space is the tensor product of those for the
individual particles 1 and 2, and if we choose it in such a way that the apparatuses reveal
prior properties it consists of commuting projectors of the form
P1jQ1k ⊗ P2j′R2l (5.10)
in a fairly obvious notation, with subscripts 1 and 2 for the different particles. This, of
course, is very different from the nonexistent (from a quantum perspective) sample space of
triples that form the arguments of Prg() in (5.6).
One might hope to get around this difficulty by using the outcomes of macroscopic
measurements (pointer positions) to define a sample space to which Prg might refer. While
this provides a formal solution to the problem, it simply conceals the difficulty that one
is trying to combine the results of different experiments carried out by different pieces of
apparatus in order to arrive at a joint probability. In general there is no unique way to do
this, as suggested by the presence of the free parameter s in (5.9).
Granted, the study of probabilities not directly connected to physical reality may nonethe-
less yield some useful insights as to what goes on in the quantum world, and given the widely
acknowledged conceptual difficulties of quantum theory, new sources of insight are welcome.
But to avoid adding further confusion to the confused state of quantum foundations, it would
be valuable if discussions of this sort were to clearly distinguish ideas and interpretations
that apply directly to quantum mechanics from those in which one is, in effect, employing
classical models (in the present instance ‘empirical models’) in place of quantum physics.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The careful analysis in Sec. 3 of what it is that quantum measurements actually measure
is needed to address the question of whether quantum mechanics is or is not contextual in
the sense originally introduced by Bell, Sec. 2: Given that A was measured together with a
compatible (AB=BA) observable B, the {A,B} context for A, would the outcome for A in
this particular run of the experiment have been the same if, instead, A had been measured
together with a compatible (AC = CA) observable C, the {A,C} context for A? The
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question is of interest when B and C are incompatible observables, BC 6= CB, so A, B, and
C cannot be measured together in a single experiment. When an analysis of the situation
is carried out, Sec. 3, using the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics,
which is capable of describing the entire measurement process in fully quantum-mechanical
terms, the conclusion, Sec. 4, is clear: If the apparatus, properly constructed and calibrated,
indicates that A had a particular value, say a1, prior to the measurement of A together with
B, then in this particular run the same result for A would have been obtained had A been
measured along with C, or with any other observable compatible with A. Thus quantum
mechanics is noncontextual, or, to be more precise, ‘Bell noncontextual ’, if one uses Bell’s
definition. It is worth noting that were quantum theory Bell contextual it would cast grave
doubt on the results of experiments, since equipment is typically designed to measure some
specific property without concern about what other compatible quantities might happen to
be measured at the same time.
However, there are other definitions of contextuality, and that discussed in Sec. 5, to which
I have given the name global contextuality, differs from Bell contextuality in two important
respects. First, rather than referring the outcome of a particular measurement, the focus is on
the probability distribution of outcomes of various measurements. Second, ‘noncontextual’
is defined in terms of the existence (and ‘contextual’ in terms of the nonexistence) of a
joint global probability distribution for a collection of quantum observables, whether or not
they commute. Such a distribution, even if it exists, need not make much sense from a
quantum-mechanical perspective. The example in Sec. 5 (b) for three observables in a 3-
dimensional Hilbert space illustrates this point: there is no quantum sample space (projective
decomposition of the identity) to which these probabilities can be assigned. If, on the other
hand, one supposes that various measurements of incompatible observables are carried out in
different runs of an experiment, of necessity using different arrangements of the experimental
apparatus, the corresponding quantum sample space, using tensor products of quantum
properties, Sec. 5 (c), is different from that imagined in the definition of the global probability
distribution. Thus while global contextuality is a well-defined mathematical concept, it is
not clear that it represents anything of fundamental physical significance in the quantum
world. It may nonetheless be a source of useful physical insight in indicating the extent to
which quantum theory can be approximated by classical concepts, provided the difference
between classical and quantum physics is not ignored.
What Bell and global (non)contextuality have in common is the notion that a PDI
associated with an observable can lie in the intersection of two or more incompatible PDIs, or
‘contexts’ (or ‘frameworks’ in the language of CH), and that one should pay attention to this
crucial respect in which quantum theory differs from classical physics. What has been lacking
in many previous discussions, and which I have attempted to supply, is a description of the
simplest form of quantum measurement, a projective measurement,3 in order to understand
what is actually measured; i.e., what the macroscopic outcome of the measurement reveals
about the microscopic state of the measured system before the measurement took place. A
large number of paradoxes in quantum foundations arise from a failure to analyze quantum
measurements in fully quantum-mechanical terms: i.e, Hilbert space rather than, say, the
(classical) hidden variables employed by Bell and his followers. For example, claims, based
3An extension to POVMs, ‘generalized measurements’, will be found in [5].
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on violations of Bell inequalities, that the quantum world is nonlocal evaporate when these
classical variables are replaced by a proper quantum analysis [3,16,20]. Similarly, discussions
of contextuality, at least to the extent that they relate to measurements, need to be based
on a clear understanding of the quantum measurement process.
Finally, to repeat what was stated in Sec. 1: the analysis presented here is concerned
only with the use of ‘(non)contextual’ in quantum physics. Whether or not, and if so how,
these ideas carry over to the use of (non)contextuality in psychology is something I must
leave to those far more knowledgeable about that subject than I.
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